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WHY IT MATTERS 
MARGARET L. PARIS* 
Does it matter that “unresolved ambiguities” and “unacknowledged 
departures from guidelines established in earlier rulings” have marked the 
Supreme Court’s free-standing due process jurisprudence, as Professor Israel 
carefully reveals?1  Or that the Court has failed to articulate consistently the 
values that animate, or should animate, its free-standing due process decisions?  
Many areas of constitutional law share these shortcomings.  Are there reasons 
why these judicial failures in free-standing due process cases might have 
especially dangerous consequences? 
There surely are reasons to be alarmed, if one believes (as I do) that the 
Court functions as a “republican schoolmaster” whose opinions “call the 
people to their senses” by inculcating values and clarifying the bases for legal 
doctrines.2  As teacher to the citizenry, the Court’s task is especially critical 
where the public is tempted to defect from the law’s underpinning values and 
manifests fundamental misunderstandings about the law’s premises.  Due 
process suffers from both of these conditions.3 
First, the public has an uneven fidelity to the “human rights” values that 
underlie due process.  Although due process is the primary assurance that 
American criminal procedure will respect the dignity of defendants, treat 
 
* Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. The author thanks Professor Leslie 
Harris for her insights and David Pebworth for his research. 
 1. See generally Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process in Criminal Procedure: The 
Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303 (2001).  Professor 
Israel uses the term “free-standing due process” to refer to the source of those rights that the 
Court has recognized as flowing from the due process clause of the Fourteenth (or Fifth) 
Amendment and not from an explicit procedural right mentioned in the Bill of Rights.  Id. at 305. 
 2. The phrases in quotation marks are from Ralph Lerner’s study assessing whether it was 
originally understood that the national judiciary would act as “teachers to the citizenry.”  See 
Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127.  Lerner 
acknowledges equivocal evidence about the original understanding of such a role for the “‘least 
dangerous’” branch.  See id. at 171 (quoting Alexander Hamilton’s THE FEDERALIST NO. 78).  
But as he remarks, even those (like Hamilton) who predicted that the national judiciary would be 
“‘least in a capacity to annoy or injure’” the people would impose on those officers a duty to “call 
the people to their senses.”  Id. 
 3. The reasons I will give apply to all criminal procedure guarantees, but they are especially 
important to free-standing due process, as I will explain. 
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defendants equally and maintain an appearance of fairness, the public’s 
commitment to such due process guarantees is easily abandoned in the throes 
of passion that crime arouses.  If left untempered, the natural tendency to vilify 
those prosecuted for crimes creates a hateful environment that breeds human 
rights violations.  As my colleague Leslie Harris puts it, in criminal cases 
“we’re never that far from Kosovo.” 
Second, the public misunderstands the basic premises for defendant-
oriented due process protections in criminal cases.  American criminal justice 
is a public process serving public goals, as opposed to a system of private 
prosecutions serving private ends.  The imposition of state power against 
individuals requires a web of defendant-oriented procedures to prevent abuses.  
As some of the rhetoric of the victims’ rights movement reveals, the public 
tends to recast criminal cases as private battles between victims and offenders, 
and as a result it seeks to invest victims with procedural power so as to offset 
defendant-oriented procedural rights.  Moreover, popular focus on private 
harms and private recompense in criminal cases also obscures the social 
benefits that accrue from defendant-oriented procedures.  Thus, the public fails 
to recognize its own stake in due process.  Later in this essay, I will recount a 
recent case in my home state of Oregon that illustrates both the public’s fickle 
attitude toward human rights in criminal cases and its misconception of due 
process’s premises. 
Public Abandonment of Human Rights Values 
Due process encompasses human rights values—my focus here is on the 
values of dignity, equality of treatment and the appearance of fairness4—to 
 
 4. Due process scholarship has identified a complex scheme of animating values, including 
dignity, equality of treatment, the appearance of fairness, participation, predictability and accurate 
decision-making.  Martin H. Redish and Lawrence C. Marshall have nicely summarized these 
values in Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 
455, 476-91 (1986).  All of these are human rights values in the sense that they are “fundamental 
rights of individuals or groups that are expressed as valid claims against [the] state.”  See Gordon 
A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 
52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 4 n.5 (1983).  When I use the phrase “human rights values,” though, I am 
referring specifically to the first three values mentioned above—dignity, equality of treatment and 
the appearance of fairness—because these form the principal protections against mistreatment 
during the pendency of the criminal process. 
  Scholars have urged courts to inform their due process decisions with human rights laws 
and concepts.  See generally, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of 
Children’s Rights: Incorporating Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 1 (1999); Christenson, supra; see generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH 
OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED & UNNAMED (1997). Although I think it is high time for 
courts in due process cases to make explicit reference to human rights concepts, what I am urging 
here is far more modest: frequent judicial reaffirmation of the human rights values that already 
have been recognized as underlying American due process. 
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whose fidelity public opinion is tenuous.  If honored, these values create an 
atmosphere of civility and decency toward those prosecuted for crimes.  Hatred 
and the desire for vengeance against offenders, however, easily overcome 
public commitment to such gentle values.  Here, where passions run 
dangerously high, the Court must continually “call the people to their senses.” 
The consequences of failing to do so can be catastrophic, because due 
process values serve as “moral resources” that enable people to behave 
humanely.  Moral philosopher Jonathan Glover, in a chilling examination of 
multiple instances of twentieth century inhumanity, points out that when moral 
resources are depleted, ordinary people become capable of acts of brutality that 
would otherwise be unthinkable.5  Through what he calls an “ethical 
interrogation” of history, Glover uncovers several moral resources that enable 
people to act humanely: first, an instinctive tendency to respond to other 
people with dignity, respect and sympathy;6 second, a sense of moral identity 
(in other words, a commitment to certain kinds of behavior and to an image of 
who we want to be)7; and third, self-interest.8 
Certain conditions, such as war or hostility against particular people or 
groups, diminish these moral resources.  In times of hostility, aggressors view 
opponents as less than human, thus reducing both the instinctive respect felt for 
opponents and the feeling of human attachment, which is a predicate of the 
capacity for sympathy.9  Moreover, in times of hostility social pressures in the 
aggressor group encourage people to replace their humanitarian moral 
identities with angrier, crueler identities.  Social pressures also change the 
calculus of self-interest among the aggressors, so that people perceive their 
interests as being wrapped up in the escalation of hostilities.10  Under these 
conditions, people are capable of shocking levels of brutality.11 
We ought to fear this phenomenon very much, because it arises in the 
aftermath of crime and causes real threats to the human rights of defendants.  
Following Glover’s example, it is easy to see several conditions in criminal 
cases that cause the public to abandon its moral resources and its commitment 
 
 5. See generally JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 33-39 (1999). 
 6. Id. at 4, 22-25.  Glover believes that humanitarian feelings are backed up by social 
pressures but are psychological (perhaps genetic) in origin. 
 7. Id. at 26-27.  Glover argues that our moral identity—a sense of who we are—limits our 
capacity for cruelty because our “inner happiness” depends on acting in conformity with our 
identity. As Glover explains, “[t]he psychological conflict generated by trampling on others will 
be often (though not always) unacceptably great.”  Id. at 27. 
 8. Id. at 18-21. 
 9. GLOVER, supra note 5, at 23-24. 
 10. Id. at 18-21. 
 11. Glover recounts many instances in the past century in which people engaged in 
extraordinary cruelty, and he traces the conditions that reduced their moral resources.  See 
generally id. 
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to due process.12  First, crime naturally invokes intense feelings of hatred and 
vengeance that overcome the humanity with which the public might otherwise 
view offenders.13 Similarly, as public commitment to war-like hostility 
mounts, individuals experience social pressure to conceal or modify their 
humanitarian moral identities in order to sound (and behave) “tough on crime.”  
Finally, social pressure encourages people to perceive their interests as 
requiring vengeful responses to crime and diminishes public willingness to 
acknowledge the social benefits of due process that I discuss below.14  Perhaps 
it is this set of conditions, whipped up by “war on crime” and “drug war” 
rhetoric, that has enabled the American public to become complicit in a 
criminal justice system that is rife with a startling level of racial, ethnic and 
class injustice.15 
The Supreme Court has not been sufficiently attentive to its duty to “call 
the people to their senses” about these conditions.  Its opinions, especially in 
 
 12. It is unclear whether commitment to human rights varies according to race, ethnicity or 
class. Research consistently shows that members of minority groups and of lower socio-economic 
groups are sensitive to unfairness and inequality in the criminal justice system.  See, e.g., 
Catherine Kaukinen & Sandra Colavecchia, Public Perceptions of the Courts: An Examination of 
Attitudes Toward the Treatment of Victims and Accused, 41 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 365, 367 
(1999) (citing studies).  On the other hand, some studies suggest that people with higher 
education levels are less likely to demand punitive sentences.  Other research suggests that 
opinions about appropriate responses to crime depend more on “attitudinal variables” than 
“sociodemographic variables.” See, e.g., id. 
 13. Scholarly literature about victim impact statements provides a rich source of information 
on the emotions that are aroused by violent crime.  See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul 
Cassell: What We Know About Victim Impact Statements, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 545 (citing social 
science data that reveals jurors are more likely to approve death sentence after hearing victim 
impact evidence) [hereinafter Bandes, Reply]; Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim-
Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 392-410 (1996) (arguing that victim impact 
statements ought to be suppressed because they “evoke emotions that do not belong” in the 
context of criminal sentencing) [hereinafter Bandes, Empathy].  But see Paul G. Cassell, 
Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. 
REV. 479 (arguing that victim impact statements help sentencers assess the real harm from 
offenders’ conduct).  See generally THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes, ed., 1999) (anthology 
exploring the roles of emotion and passion in the law). 
 14. The benefit I principally refer to is an increase of law-abiding behavior that results when 
defendants are treated in ways they perceive as fair.  See infra text accompanying note 36. 
 15. The literature supporting this statement is well known.  For a few key resources, see 
generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE (1999); CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL 
JUSTICE (1993); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT (1995), and references therein.  Stephen 
Bright points out that the war on crime mentality has also reduced the accuracy of decision-
making in the criminal justice system.  See generally Stephen B. Bright, Casualties of the War on 
Crime: Fairness, Reliability and the Credibility of Criminal Justice Systems, 51 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 413 (1997). 
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recent years, fail to remind the people in clear and sweeping terms16 that 
important human rights values are at stake in criminal cases.  Indeed, for the 
most part, the Court has been silent with respect to these values or mentions 
them only perfunctorily.  The Court’s very few, and now antique, opinions that 
have ventured into human rights waters see little current “air time” and have 
become nothing more than futile citations in defense briefs.17 
The Court can reduce the dangerous war-like atmosphere that attends 
criminal cases by continually reminding the public that its Constitution 
embodies a moral commitment to human rights.18  Although hatred for 
criminals may be instinctive, that emotion needs to be restrained by a public 
morality that continually reinforces the importance of treating defendants 
fairly, equally and with dignity.  Such a public morality would encourage 
people to aspire to act consistently with those values, as part of their moral 
identities.  Finally, an effective public morality would remind the people that 
their self-interest depends on maintaining those values.19 
Popular Misconceptions about Defendant-Oriented Procedural Rights 
In addition to its uneven commitment to the human rights values that 
underlie due process, the public appears to have a fundamental 
misunderstanding about the premises that require defendant-oriented 
procedural rights.  Ours is a system of public prosecution20 directed toward 
 
 16. As Carol Steiker points out, many scholars have criticized the Court’s opinions in recent 
years for their incomprehensibility.  See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2538-39 (1996). 
 17. I should know, having written many defense briefs resorting to such futile citations. 
 18. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 162, 173 (1952). 
 19. There is good reason to believe that the Court can effectively create such a public 
morality.  The Court has considerable legitimacy in the public’s mind.  See generally BARBARA 
A. PERRY, THE PRIESTLY TRIBE (1999).  Moreover, social science data confirms that the Court’s 
opinions do shape public attitudes.  See generally WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS: LAW AND ATTITUDE CHANGE (1967); STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1972).  This is especially true where the public has the benefit 
of skilled “translators” to help it understand Court pronouncements and where interest groups 
have a stake in the outcome of cases.  See MUIR, supra, at 111-21.  In recent years, prosecutors 
have become the most powerful translators of Supreme Court opinions in criminal procedure 
cases and victims’ rights groups the most active stakeholders.  If the Court were to make a greater 
effort to illuminate the history and values that underlie defendant-oriented criminal procedures, a 
wider range of translators (including, perhaps, defense lawyer groups and civil rights experts) 
would have incentives to explain the Court’s decisions to the public.  In addition, more people 
might view themselves to be stakeholders in our system of procedural rights. 
 20. In Anglo-American criminal justice systems, the state “steals the conflict” from victim 
and offender.  See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Some Doubts About Restorative Justice, 4 CRIM. L.F. 
277 (1993) (using phrase from Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 
4 (1977)); Sue Anna Moss Cellini, The Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States: Opening the Door of the Criminal Justice System to the Victim, 14 ARIZ. J. 
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public goals.21  Victims are not parties in criminal cases, and private 
prosecutions seeking vengeance, compensation or other private ends, are rarely 
permitted or pursued.22  Because of the public character of American criminal 
justice, the constitutional guarantees that protect individuals against state 
power extend to those suspected, accused or convicted of crimes, and not to 
victims or the state representing victims’ interests.23 
This orientation results in procedures that appear one-sided at first.  For 
example, there is no point in a criminal prosecution at which one can avoid 
asking, “Does this procedure affect the defendant’s rights?”  On the other 
hand, there are many points at which the victim’s interests remain 
unacknowledged or subordinate to the defendant’s rights.  Every defendant 
enjoys a constitutionally protected right to be present in the courtroom, to 
protect his right to confront witnesses24 and, when witnesses are not present, to 
preserve the “fulness [sic] of his opportunity to defend against the charge.”25  
Thus, the defendant may not be excluded from the courtroom even if the court 
fears that his testimony would be affected by hearing the testimony of other 
witnesses.  On the other hand, crime victims constitutionally can be excluded 
 
INT’L & COMP. L. 839, 842-48 (1997) (describing history of public prosecution in the United 
States). 
 21. Among these is the orderly enforcement of laws through decisions that punish, reform, 
or incapacitate lawbreakers, deter others from lawbreaking, and express societal disapproval of 
lawbreaking.  The maintenance of individual rights against state power also is a prominent public 
goal of American criminal justice.  See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: 
The State’s Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1045-50 (1987). 
 22. Victim participation is reduced in our system, although victims may have rights to 
restitution and to sue civilly, and under some circumstances, to engage in a private prosecution.  
See, e.g., Cellini, supra note 20, at 867-68 (referencing survival of private prosecution statutes in 
some states); John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private 
Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 552-97 (1994) (arguing that private prosecutors violate due 
process).  Victim participation in criminal cases appears more pervasive in other legal systems, 
but those systems feature significant structural differences.  See William T. Pizzi & Walter 
Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on American 
Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37, 45 (1996); Matti Joutsen, Listening to the Victim: The 
Victim’s Role in European Criminal Justice Systems, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 95, 96-102 (1987); 
Daniel W. Van Ness, New Wine and Old Wineskins: Four Challenges of Restorative Justice, 4 
CRIM. L. F. 251, 259 (1993) (suggesting reconceptualization of Anglo-American criminal justice 
to feature a collaborative effort between victims, offenders and government). 
 23. The prosecution sometimes enjoys reciprocal procedural benefits, but these are not rights 
in the same sense.  See Bandes, supra note 21, at 1022-24. Of course, as Professor Israel points 
out, the Court frequently decides due process claims by examining the interests of society and the 
prosecution.  See Israel, supra note 1, at 420-24. 
 24. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (“We have never doubted . . . that the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing 
before the trier of fact.”). 
 25. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934); United States v. Gagnon, 470 
U.S. 522 (1985); Israel, supra note 1, at 372, 391 n.502. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] WHY IT MATTERS 501 
from trial proceedings.  Even where statutes or state provisions provide a right 
to victims to be present, 26 they may nevertheless be excluded if the trial court 
believes their testimony would be affected by the testimony of others.27 
This lack of parity between defendant and victim runs counter to popular 
expectations.28  It has been a central tenet of the victim’s rights movement, 
whose advocates (including many prosecutors) envision criminal cases as 
battles between offenders and victims29 and who argue that because defendants 
have procedural rights, victims should have them too.30  For example, a task 
force appointed in 1982 by President Reagan characterized the criminal justice 
system as a set of scales “out of balance,” evoking the image of defendants’ 
rights on one side of the scale and victims’ rights on the other.31  This theme 
has been taken up in state constitutions and statutes.  My own state recently 
amended its constitution to add a “Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights,” the stated 
purposes of which are: 
To preserve and protect the right of crime victims to justice, to ensure crime 
victims a meaningful role in the criminal and juvenile justice systems, to 
 
 26. States have enacted constitutional and statutory provisions granting procedural rights to 
crime victims.  See Robert P. Mosteller & H. Jefferson Powell, With Disdain for the 
Constitutional Craft: The Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment, 78 N.C. L. REV. 371, 374 
(2000).  Those rights are enforceable only to the extent they do not conflict with federal 
constitutional guarantees, although as Mosteller and Powell point out, few victims’ rights run 
afoul of federal guarantees.  See id.  Victims also enjoy rights granted by federal statute.  Again 
those rights are limited by constitutional guarantees and, if the statute so provides, by other 
concerns, such as the need for accurate fact finding.  See id. at 375; see also United States v. 
McVeigh,106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing the Victim’s Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, 
42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(4) (1994)). 
 27. See McVeigh, 106 F.3d at 325 (affirming, in Oklahoma City bombing case, trial court’s 
exclusion from trial proceedings of victims who would be presenting impact evidence at 
sentencing).  In the federal system, crime victims have a statutory right “to be present at all public 
court proceedings related to the offense.”  See id. at 334 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(4)).  That 
right is limited by the trial court’s power to exclude victims if it determines “that testimony by the 
victim would be materially affected if the victim heard other testimony at trial.”  Id. at 335. 
According to the Tenth Circuit in McVeigh, the limitation subordinates the victim’s right to the 
policies expressed in Federal Rule of Evidence 615, which provides: “At the request of a party the 
court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.”  
Id. 
 28. Apparently it runs counter to the expectations of some judges as well.  See, e.g., Joshua 
D. Greenberg, Is Payne Defensible?: The Constitutionality of Admitting Victim-Impact Evidence 
at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 75 IND. L.J. 1349, 1379-80 (2000) (describing a “balancing” 
justification that some courts have used in order to craft victim participation that offsets the 
“privileged” position that the criminal justice system affords defendants). 
 29. See Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 101. 
 30. See Lynne Henderson, Co-Opting Compassion: The Federal Victim’s Rights 
Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 582-83 (1998). 
 31. See Cellini, supra note 20, at 853-54 (citing PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF 
CRIMES, FINAL REPORT vi (Dec. 1982)). 
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accord crime victims due dignity and respect and to ensure that criminal and 
juvenile court delinquency proceedings are conducted to seek the truth as to 
the defendant’s innocence or guilt, and also to ensure that a fair balance is 
struck between the rights of crime victims and the rights of criminal defendants 
in the course and conduct of criminal and juvenile court delinquency 
proceedings.32 
Even leaving the victims’ rights movement aside, it is not hard to 
understand why the public would expect parity between defendants and 
victims: within American culture many people believe that every question has 
two sides, and that a fair resolution of any question requires giving the two 
opponents an equal opportunity to battle it out.33  There is no reason to think 
that the public is aware that the structure of criminal procedure diverges from 
this victim-offender battle model.34  Without constantly reminding the public 
why due process has a defendant orientation, we can hardly expect the public 
to abandon its commitment to a notion of parity between victims and 
defendants.35 
 
 32. OR. CONST. art. I, § 42, cl. 1 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 33. See generally DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: STOPPING AMERICA’S 
WAR OF WORDS (1999). Tannen, who writes about contemporary American culture, argues that 
Americans are wedded to a battle model of communication, which posits differences as polarities 
that are to be resolved by confrontation.  The loudest and most skilled advocates emerge the 
victors in these confrontations, and there is little attention paid to understanding other points of 
view, perceiving shared interests and values, and developing consensus. 
 34. The victims’ rights movement encourages the public to view the criminal process as a 
battle between offenders and victims.  See, e.g., Harris, supra note 29, at 101.  Social science data 
suggests that the public is susceptible to such an invitation, because it lacks knowledge about 
many aspects of criminal justice in the United States.  See Deborah W. Denno, The Perils of 
Public Opinion, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 741, 753-55 (2000) (citing research documenting public 
ignorance about “matters significant to criminal justice policy,” including the nature and extent of 
crime, recidivism rates, laws, legal rights and sentencing policies).  Tom Tyler and John Darley 
confirm popular misconceptions about law and legal procedure and the need for “public 
education.”  See Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public 
Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating 
Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 728-29 (2000) (citing studies). 
 35. When I urge the Court to “call the people to their senses” about due process values that 
are inconsistent with some of the goals of the victims’ rights movement, I do not mean to suggest 
that victims should have no role in the criminal process.  But victims’ roles must be carefully 
crafted to avoid diminishing public commitment to human rights values.  Moreover, prosecutors 
must be careful not to become victims’ advocates.  See Walker A. Matthews, Note, Proposed 
Victims’ Rights Amendment: Ethical Considerations for the Prudent Prosecutor, 11 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 735, 743 (1998).  Others have written extensively on the appropriate role of 
victims in the criminal process, especially after the United States Supreme Court decided Payne 
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), which permits victim impact statements in capital sentencing 
proceedings.  See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 28, at 1381-82 (disagreeing with Payne on 
constitutional grounds); Bandes, Reply, supra note 13; Bandes, Empathy, supra note 13; Vivian 
Berger, Payne and Suffering—A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. 
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The public needs to be educated also about the societal benefits that accrue 
from adherence to defendant-oriented procedures.  Among these is the 
likelihood that defendants will be more law-abiding in the future if they 
believe they have been treated fairly during the criminal process.  Tom Tyler 
and John Darley have recently described several findings that support this 
statement.36  Studies demonstrate that law-abidingness requires “supportive 
public values.”37  Chief among these is a belief in the legitimacy of legal 
authority, and legitimacy depends on a perception that legal authorities use fair 
procedures to make decisions.38  Studies suggest that even lawbreakers tend to 
be more law-abiding in the future if they believe they have been treated 
fairly.39  The lesson is that society as a whole benefits in terms of law-
abidingness (and presumably lower recidivism rates) from procedures that are 
oriented around fairness to the defendant—procedures that, among other 
things, respect the defendant’s dignity, ensure equal treatment and maintain the 
appearance of fairness. 
When prosecutors, victims and politicians demand severe punishments, 
they encourage the public to overlook the social benefits of due process,40 and 
as a result the Court needs to step in and “call the people to their senses.”  
Although the Court on rare occasions has made reference to rehabilitative 
aspects of due process,41 it must articulate the link between due process and 
 
U. L. REV. 21 (1992) (arguing that permitting victims to present impact evidence “actually 
amounts to a step backward for their cause”).  But see Cassell, supra note 13.  See also generally 
Robert P. Mosteller, Victims’ Rights and the United States Constitution: An Effort to Recast the 
Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1694 (1997) (arguing that the victims’ rights 
movement is an effort to reduce or deny defendants’ rights). 
 36. See generally Tyler & Darley, supra note 34, at 722-39 (describing “psychological 
jurisprudence” research). 
 37. Id. at 738-39. 
 38. Id. at 722-24.  See also, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law 
Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 400-01 (2000). 
 39. Id. at 724. 
 40. Victims, because they are “prone to vindictive attitudes,” rarely pay attention to 
reformative goals and overwhelmingly complain that defendants are treated too leniently.  See 
Donald J. Hall, Victims’ Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
233, 244 (1991).  They may even exaggerate the harms done in order to convince courts to mete 
out severe penalties.  See Robert C. Black, Forgotten Penological Purposes: A Critique of Victim 
Participation in Sentencing, 1994 AM. J. JURIS. 225, 230-32.  Other studies have found that in 
some contexts (for example, settlement conferences in which victims are allowed to participate), 
victims do not necessarily demand the maximum authorized penalty.  See Hall, supra, at 244-45. 
 41. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging 
broad admissibility of non-coerced confessions: “Not only for society, but for the wrongdoer 
himself, admission of guilt, if not coerced, is inherently desirable because it advances the goals of 
both justice and rehabilitation”); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (involving due 
process rights owed parolee) (“[S]ociety has a further interest in treating the parolee with basic 
fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding 
reactions to arbitrariness.”). 
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law abidingness much more clearly and consistently if it is to counteract the 
punitive messages of powerful interest groups.  In other words, the Court 
should remind the public that its own self-interest is enhanced when due 
process is honored, so that the public will consider itself a stakeholder in our 
system of defendant-oriented procedural rights. 
What I have said above argues for a renewed attention to the Court’s 
teaching role throughout criminal procedure cases.  But that role probably is 
especially important in free-standing due process cases, which tend to involve 
defendant-oriented rights about which the public knows very little.  A large 
fraction of the public probably is aware of some of the rights embodied in 
explicit Bill of Rights guarantees, such as the search and seizure provisions and 
the right against self-incrimination.  Undoubtedly much less is known 
popularly about some of the rights embodied within free-standing due 
process.42  Not only are search and seizure and confession provisions more 
obviously part of our public conversation (they feature prominently in 
television and movie portrayals of police-citizen encounters), but also the 
prototypic behaviors they regulate—government snooping, police brutality and 
so on—fall into instantly recognizable patterns.  Psychological research 
suggests that people make judgments by analogizing to familiar patterns, and 
legal rules that fit familiar patterns are more likely to be understood 
accurately.43  Some of the free-standing due process guarantees are less readily 
analogized to familiar patterns.  The right of represented defendants to be 
present during trial, for example, lacks an immediately relevant analog.  
Because the public may have a lower level of understanding about the defense 
orientation of procedural protections that spring from free-standing due 
process, it is especially important that the Court’s opinions in those cases fulfill 
the “republican schoolmaster” role. 
 
 42. Carol Steiker uses Meir Dan-Cohen’s distinction between “conduct rules” and “decision 
rules” to suggest that the public is much more aware of the Supreme Court’s “conduct rules” for 
police than its “decision rules,” which regulate what happens at trial.  See Steiker, supra note 16, 
at 2532-40 (referencing Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630-32 (1984)). 
 43. See Dan M. Kahan, Lay Perceptions of Justice vs. Criminal Law Doctrine: False 
Dichotomy?, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 793 (2000) (summarizing theory of pattern recognition and 
current research).  The public also appears to have a very detailed set of expectations about some 
sorts of police conduct and government snooping.  See generally Christopher Slobogin & Joseph 
E. Schumacher, Rating the Intrusiveness of Law Enforcement Searches and Seizures, 17 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 183 (1993). 
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Lessons from the Kip Kinkel Sentencing 
A recent Oregon case exemplifies what happens when the public’s 
commitment to human rights values is overcome by hatred and when the 
public’s misunderstanding about the appropriate role of victims is left 
uncorrected.  The case promised from the beginning to have a tragic outcome.  
It featured a large group of victims who engaged in an extreme form of “victim 
allocution.”44  The victims were pitted against (to use a battle image) a 
defendant who was both unusually sympathetic (by virtue of his youth and 
undisputedly serious mental illness) and unusually dangerous.  Refereeing the 
battle was a trial judge who applied Oregon law carefully but declined to 
employ the larger notion of due process to “call the people to their senses.”  
Though you may be familiar with the facts of this case broadly, a more detailed 
examination follows. 
On May 21, 1998, fifteen-year-old Kip Kinkel opened fire on students in 
his Springfield, Oregon high school cafeteria.45  Kinkel was small and slight, 
and fellow students quickly wrestled him to the floor, disarmed him and beat 
and kicked him.46  Before that happened, however, he had killed two students 
and wounded twenty-five others.47  After his arrest Kinkel was suicidal and 
distraught.48  He charged at a detective brandishing a knife he pulled out of his 
sock.49  Officers subdued and interrogated Kinkel without giving him an 
 
 44. I have borrowed the word “allocution” from its common law context, in which it referred 
to the convicted defendant’s opportunity to speak before sentencing.  See Black, supra note 40.  
More broadly, to allocute means to speak, to address, even to exhort.  See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 236 (2d ed. 1961), available at http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00006068.  The 
victims in my Oregon case did all that, and more.  They were permitted to express hatred toward 
the defendant, threaten him with physical harm, and inflict on him what can only be called 
psychic damage.  The victims also were permitted to give their opinions about the appropriate 
sentence.  Not surprisingly, they demanded that the sentencing judge mete out the harshest 
possible sentence. 
 45. Information about the shooting, and the aftermath, can be found on the Web site of the 
REGISTER-GUARD, the local newspaper for the Eugene-Springfield, Oregon area.  See 
Information Related To the May 21, 1998, Thurston High School Shootings in Springfield, Ore., 
THE REGISTER-GUARD, available at http://www.registerguard.com/standingdocs/shoot_items. 
html. 
 46. See Eric Mortenson, Tragedy Hits Home: Shootings In Springfield, THE REGISTER-
GUARD, May 22, 1998, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19980522/1a.shooting. 
0522.html. 
 47. As students held him down he reportedly said, “Just shoot me. Shoot me now.” See Joe 
Kidd, Teen-agers’ Bravery Earns Praise Amid the Anguish, THE REGISTER-GUARD, May 23, 
1998, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19980523/1a.rykerhero.0523.html. 
 48. See Bill Bishop, Kinkel’s Pretrial Hearing Wraps Up, THE REGISTER-GUARD, March 6, 
1999, available at http://www.registerguard.com/ news/19990306/1a.kinkel.0306.html. 
 49. See Janelle Hartman, Boy Charged as Adult on 4 Counts of Murder, THE REGISTER-
GUARD, May 23, 1998, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19980523/1a.mainstory. 
0523.html. 
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opportunity to consult with counsel, although a defense attorney had rushed to 
the jail where he was being held.50  Police feared that Kinkel had planted 
bombs in his home, and upon searching the home they discovered the bodies of 
Kinkel’s mother and father, whom he apparently had killed the previously 
evening.51  By nightfall, local and national news media were giving the story 
extensive coverage.  Kinkel was placed under suicide watch at the county 
juvenile detention center.  Personnel reported that he appeared grief-stricken 
and the suicide watch continued throughout his detention.52 
The Lane County District Attorney’s office charged Kinkel with twenty-
six counts of attempted murder and four counts of aggravated murder, a capital 
offense under Oregon law, though Kinkel’s youth made him ineligible for the 
death penalty.53  It was clear from the outset of the case that Kinkel’s lawyers 
would most likely mount an insanity defense, and although the prosecution 
planned to contest his legal insanity it never disputed the fact that he was 
seriously mentally ill.  There was much evidence that Kinkel had been 
mentally ill for years, and that his family (and a treating psychologist) had 
gravely underestimated the seriousness of his illness.54  For example, virtually 
from birth Kinkel had stuck out like a sore thumb in his talented family.55  His 
parents had difficulty controlling him but only sporadically sought professional 
 
 50. See Bishop, supra note 48.  The trial judge later upheld Kinkel’s Miranda waiver of 
counsel, accepting the prosecution’s argument that Kinkel was not rendered incompetent to waive 
his rights either by virtue of his youth or his mental condition, and that he had waived his rights 
knowingly and intelligently.  See Bill Bishop, Kinkel’s Statements Admissible, Judge Rules, THE 
REGISTER-GUARD, June 9, 1999, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19990609/1a. 
kinkelevidence.0609.html. 
 51. See Hartman, supra note 49. 
 52. See Eric Mortenson, Kinkel’s Conduct Troubled Jailers, THE REGISTER-GUARD, Nov. 2, 
1999, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19991102/1a.kinkel.1102.html.  
According to a PBS Frontline documentary about the case, Kinkel became “increasingly upset as 
he describes [to police] killing his father and putting a sheet over his body, wailing and crying 
and hyperventilating.  Through his tears he says, ‘I told her I loved her,’ before he killed his 
mother.  Then he screams, ‘God damn the voices in my head!’”  Frontline: The Killer at Thurston 
High (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 18, 2000), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/shows/kinkel/trial/ [hereinafter Frontline].  The Frontline documentary highlights 
Kinkel’s “descent into darkness and murder.”  See Diane Dietz, Kinkel Documentary Fleshes Out 
Tragedy, THE REGISTER-GUARD, January 12, 2000, available at http://www.registerguard.com/ 
news/20000112/1d.cr.frontline.0112.html. 
 53. Links to court documents can be found on the Lane County Web site, at 
http://www.co.lane.or.us/trial/. 
 54. Aside from failing to get adequate help for Kinkel’s illness, his parents also purchased 
him at least one gun.  See Joe Mosley, Kinkels: Neighbors and Friends Paint a Picture of a Level-
headed Family Whose Son Had a Fascination with Guns, THE REGISTER-GUARD, May 22, 1998, 
available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19980522/1a.kinkels.0522.html. 
 55. See, e.g., id. 
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treatment for him.56  Dr. Jeffrey Hicks, a psychologist who had treated Kinkel 
over a six-month period, testified that Kinkel was “angry and depressed,”57 but 
psychologists hired by the defense believed that he had suffered from auditory 
hallucinations for years, that he was psychotic and that he possibly suffered 
from schizophrenia or paranoid schizophrenia.58  A pediatric neurologist 
performed brain scans and found that Kinkel had brain lesions that would have 
 
 56. See Frontline, supra note 52, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/kinkel/trial/#4.  Dr. Jeffrey Hicks, who had been Kinkel’s treating psychologist for six 
months, testified regarding Faith Kinkel’s concern about “anti-social acting out.” 
 57. Hicks testified that he met with Kinkel and his mother nine times.  During these visits, 
Kinkel did not mention voices or hallucinations, but Hicks found him “angry and depressed” and 
recommended that his physician prescribe medication.  Id.  Apparently Kinkel improved after 
taking Prozac, but his parents discontinued the medication after a short while.  Id. 
 58. See id.  For example, Dr. Orin Bolstad, a child psychologist who examined Kinkel for 
more than thirty-two hours and performed a battery of tests, testified that Kinkel’s auditory 
hallucinations had begun in sixth grade.  Id.  As Frontline recounts Bolstad’s testimony, 
Kip told him that he remembered the first time he heard a voice; it said, “You are a stupid 
piece of shit.  You aren’t worth anything.”  They scared and upset him, he said, and he 
tried various things to quiet them: biking, watching TV, punching his head.  According to 
Bolstad, Kip said that he never told anyone about the voices because he was embarrassed. 
He didn’t want anyone, especially girls, to think he was crazy.  Bolstad also related his 
discussion with Kip about an incident in 1998 when he had disrupted English class by 
shouting, “God damn this voice inside my head!”  This is the only time before the 
shootings that any mention of voices was recorded.  Bolstad believed that Kip murdered 
his parents and opened fired on fellow students the next day . . . under the influence of 
these hallucinatory voices.  He described Kip recounting the voices to him: “‘My Dad was 
sitting at the bar [in the kitchen].  The voices said, ‘Shoot him.’  I had no choice.  The 
voices said I had no choice.’ and later, after he killed his mother, ‘The voices said, ‘Go to 
school and kill everybody.  Look what you’ve already done.’”  During cross-examination, 
Bolstad stated categorically, “I think the primary thing that was operating in his feeling 
and need to kill . . . were the voices.” 
Frontline, supra note 52.  Dr. William Sack, another child psychiatrist who interviewed Kinkel, 
concluded that Kinkel was “a very very sick psychotic individual.”  Id.  Sack also said that as 
Kinkel grew older he might “eventually might fall into the schizoaffective category or into 
paranoid schizophrenia.”  Id.  Sack concurred with Bolstad that auditory hallucinations were the 
immediate cause of the shootings: “I feel his crimes and his behavior over those two days are the 
direct result of a psychotic product that was building over three years that suddenly emerged, 
taking over his ego.”  Id.  When asked whether Kinkel could have been lying to the psychologists 
in order to convince them of a mental illness, Dr. Sack said he had employed a “validity analysis” 
that consisted of “a formal evaluation of the content and consistency of Kip’s statements, his 
affect during the interviews and the results of various tests designed to figure out if he was telling 
the truth.”  Id.  Pursuant to this analysis, Sack concluded that Kinkel “was so consistent in the 
details of his stories and emotional reactions that he was as sure as he could be that Kip was not 
faking.”  Frontline, supra note 52.  Dr. Sack concluded, “If he were lying to me, he would be the 
best actor I’ve ever seen.” Id. 
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impeded his impulse control.59  Kinkel himself was terrified by his illness and 
agonized over his problems and their impact on his family.60 
The trial was expected to be a showdown between the defense experts and 
a well-known prosecution insanity expert nicknamed “Dr. Death” by the 
defense bar for his role in defeating insanity claims throughout the country.61  
Publicity was extraordinary, and public sentiment against the defendant ran 
high, as might be expected.  The trial judge refused to move the trial’s venue to 
another location.62  On the eve of trial, the prosecution and Kinkel’s lawyers 
agreed to a plea agreement under which Kinkel would admit his sanity and his 
intent to kill and plead guilty to four murder and twenty-six attempted murder 
counts.63  The benefit to Kinkel from the deal was that it removed the 
possibility of a jury convicting him of aggravated murder, which in Oregon 
carries a potential life without parole sentence.  As part of the deal the parties 
also agreed that the sentences on the murder counts should run concurrently.64  
 
 59. See id. (testimony of Dr. Richard J. Konkol).  At the sentencing hearing, Dr. Konkol 
displayed a computer scan of Kinkel’s brain. Dr. Konkol testified that these revealed lesions, or 
holes, in the frontal lobe.  According to Konkol: 
  These images revealed reduced blood flow to the frontal lobe, the area associated 
with emotional control and decisionmaking.  He testified that this reduced brain activity 
was consistent with new research on children who become schizophrenic, and that he 
thought it could make Kip more susceptible to a psychotic episode. 
Id. 
 60. In a note found in his home after the killings, for example, Kinkel wrote: 
  I have just killed my parents!  I don’t know what is happening.  I love my mom and 
dad so much.  I just got two felonies on my record.  My parents can’t take that!  It would 
destroy them. The embarrassment would be too much for them.  They couldn’t live with 
themselves.  I’m so sorry. I am a horrible son.  I wish I had been aborted.  I destroy 
everything I touch.  I can’t eat.  I can’t sleep.  I didn’t deserve them.  They were 
wonderful people.  It’s not their fault or the fault of any person, organization, or television 
show.  My head just doesn’t work right.  God damn these VOICES inside my head.  I 
want to die.  I want to be gone.  But I have to kill people.  I don’t know why.  I am so 
sorry!  Why did God do this to me.  I have never been happy.  I wish I was happy.  I wish 
I made my mother proud.  I am nothing!  I tried so hard to find happiness.  But you know 
me I hate everything.  I have no other choice.  What have I become?  I am so sorry. 
Frontline, supra note 52, available at http://pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/kip/ 
writings.html. 
 61. See Paul Neville, Expert Put Kinkel on Defensive, THE REGISTER-GUARD, Sept. 26, 
1999, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19990926/1a.dietz.0926.html. 
 62. See Bill Bishop & Eric Mortenson, Kinkel Trial Delayed, THE REGISTER-GUARD, Feb. 
18, 1999, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19990218/1a.kinkel.0218.html; see 
also Bill Bishop, Kinkel’s Attorneys Want Trial Relocated, THE REGISTER-GUARD, Dec. 16, 
1998, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19981216/1a.kinkel.1216.html. 
 63. See Defendant’s Plea Petition, Oregon v. Kinkel, No. 20-98-09574, slip op. (Lane 
County Ct. 1999), available at http://www.co.lane.or.us/trial/pleatext.htm. 
 64. Frontline, supra note 52.  Under Oregon law, the maximum sentence on the murder 
convictions was twenty-five years in prison.  See http://www.co.lane.or.us/trial/pleatext.htm. 
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There was no agreement, however, about whether the attempted murder 
sentences should run concurrently,65 and the parties proceeded to a sentencing 
hearing. 
The stakes at the hearing were high, because the judge had to decide 
whether to sentence Kinkel to an effective life without parole sentence (if he 
were to order consecutive sentences on the attempted murder counts Kinkel 
would face up to 220 years in prison)66 or a concurrent term of years (a 
minimum of twenty-five) that would give Kinkel the possibility of freedom 
much later in his life.  The prosecution urged consecutive sentences.  The 
defense put on the expert witnesses discussed above in an effort both to 
mitigate Kinkel’s acts and to convince the court that he could safely be 
released in the future, with appropriate treatment and medication.67 
The judge devoted a full day of the sentencing hearing to hearing from 
more than fifty victims and members of victims’ families.68  Statements of 
these victims served as a counterweight to the defense plea for the possibility 
of freedom in the future.69  The words of these victims were powerful.  Many 
of the victims expressed hatred and anger, speaking directly to the defendant.70  
Several told Kinkel that he deserved to die and threatened violence.  One 
wounded student spoke to Kinkel thus during his statement: 
I think prison, a lifetime in prison is too good for you.  If a dog was to go 
insane and if a dog got rabid and it bit someone, you destroy it.  So I stand here 
and I ask, why haven’t you been destroyed? . . . You don’t deserve to live. You 
don’t deserve to breathe. . . . I can’t stand here and look at you without wanting 
to kill you.71 
 
 65. These carried minimum sentences of ninety months each, and under Oregon law the 
judge could order the sentences to be served consecutively.  See Defendant’s Plea Petition, 
Oregon v. Kinkel, No. 20-98-09574, slip op. (Lane County Ct. 1999), available at 
http://www.co.lane.or.us/trial/pleatext.htm. 
 66. Oregon, like many states, has abolished its parole system. Kinkel would be required to 
complete the term of years ordered, minus statutory “good time.”  See id. Oregon retains the 
possibility of executive clemency. See Judge’s Statement, Oregon v. Kinkel, No. 20-98-09574, 
slip op. (Lane County Ct. 1999), available at http://www.co.lane.or.us/trial/ 
judge’s_statement.htm. 
 67. Dr. Konkol, the defense neurologist, testified that Kinkel “might improve under proper 
medication and treatment.”  See Frontline, supra note 52. 
 68. See Bill Bishop, Victims Have Their Say: Sentence Expected Today, THE REGISTER-
GUARD, Nov. 10, 1999, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/19991110/ 
1a.kinkel.1110.html. 
 69. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kinkel, No. 20-98-09574, slip op. (Lane County Ct. 1999).  A 
complete transcript of the victims’ statements [hereinafter Victim Impact Statements] is on file 
with the Saint Louis University Law Journal.  Some of the statements are available on the web, as 
indicated. 
 70. See Neville, supra note 61. 
 71. For the complete statement of Jakob Ryker, see Frontline, supra note 52, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/trial/victims.html. The media widely 
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Another victim, the mother of a wounded student, said this to Kinkel: 
Death wouldn’t have been the answer for you, or for us.  To get any kind of 
justice, for you to be tortured and troubled as we are is, to me, the final justice.  
Knowing the kind of person that you are, it’s not going to be long, when you 
get put into prison, that you’re going to become someone’s little friend. And 
everyone knows that.72 
A father stated, “Kip, I’m a pacifist.  I have endured many things without 
taking a blow back.  But if the court allowed me, I would kick the shit out of 
you.”73  There were victims who did not express anger or hatred.  One student 
said, “I don’t hate you.  I have no hate inside of me for you.  In fact, I care 
about you.”74  Such sentiments, however, were few.  Neither the defense nor 
the prosecution objected during the victim statements, and the trial judge 
stemmed the tide of these expressions only once. 
In addition to their expressions of feelings to the defendant, the victims 
appeared to believe they should share their own sentencing preferences.  Said a 
parent, “We’re here in a court of law today to tell you what we think is a fair 
sentence for those crimes.”75  Forty of the fifty-two victim statements 
expressed an opinion about the appropriate sentence, and thirty-eight of those 
called specifically for life in prison.  Only Kristen Kinkel, the defendant’s 
sister and daughter of the slain parents, urged the judge to give Kinkel a chance 
of freedom in the future.76  Some victims commented on the consecutive 
 
portrayed Ryker as a hero, because he had helped disarm Kinkel. See, e.g., Mortenson, supra note 
46. 
 72. Statements by Kip Kinkel’s Victims and Their Survivors, THE REGISTER-GUARD, 
available at http://www.registerguard.com/standingdocs/shoot_victims.html. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Victim Impact Statements, supra note 69, at 21. 
 75. Id. at 44. 
 76. Frontline, supra note 52, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/trial/ 
letter.html.  Kristen Kinkel read this letter to the trial judge: 
  Dear Judge Mattison. I am shaken by how difficult this letter is for me to write. I was 
told that you may need it to better understand my little brother.  I wish there was an ideal 
place to begin.  But where does one start when a loved one’s life is laid across someone 
else’s table? 
  What keeps me believing in him and loving him is the fact that he is a good person 
that came from a good home.  I feel silly writing that, because it seems so contradictory, 
looking at what actually took place.  However, it’s the truth, and it keeps me alive.  I wish 
more than anything that you, the man who decides his fate, could know him like I do.  So 
a little bit of the Kip Kinkel that I know is where I will begin. 
  Growing up with him was very average.  I was the typical big sister, and he seemed 
like every other little brother I had ever had any contact with.  Only with hindsight do I 
truly see the signs of someone who was in desperate need of help, different help than any 
of us knew how to give. 
  Kip was a very compassionate person.  Like my mother, the norm for him was to put 
others first.  He absolutely loved animals and treated them better than most.  He was a 
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people pleaser.  He found ways to learn what those around him wanted and made every 
effort to become it.  I believe that is how he dealt with his illness so well and with such 
subtlety for so long. 
  He was genuinely concerned about the same issues kids his age are, and unusually 
devoted to those that meant something extra special to him.  When asked about his 
interests and opinions, he was able to rationally explain his ideas about them in ways far 
beyond those which someone his age would be capable of.  He was very likeable and had 
a great sense of humor.  He loved to make people laugh and did it well.  My mother and I 
used to say that he would be a wonderful boyfriend because of his sensitivity and his 
devotion to what he loved.  Kip had a lot of potential, and to see that die absolutely 
crushes me. 
  That is who I remember Kip to be, and let me tell you about who he is today.  He’s 
extremely bright, and the potential I mentioned before is still there, buried inside.  He is 
hurting more than any of us can imagine, and yet is adapting to an extremely unpleasant 
situation better than most ever could.  He is polite and considerate to those that have 
contact with him.  He is realistic about his situation, yet remains hopeful that he will find 
something positive in it. 
  He does have plans for the future and has discussed with me his ideas of becoming a 
productive member of society, even from behind bars.  All of his hopes and dreams have 
to do with getting an education and using it to help people without one.  He already has 
passed the GED with very high scores. 
  I believe what he needs is the hope that he has a chance of achieving these goals.  
My first visit with him after this happened was at Skipworth and consisted of only crying.  
It took weeks for him to make eye contact with me, and even longer to say something.  
When he finally did, it was, ‘I am so sorry.’ 
  I believe he is aware of the pain that he has caused, and is just as shocked as the rest 
of us that he was capable of such horror.  We were talking last week about the upcoming 
hearings and preparing ourselves for the things that we would have to listen to. I told him 
to do what I do, and just tune out that which you don’t want to hear.  I told him to go to a 
safe place in his memory, and not listen to the victims when they talk, because they are 
angry and going to say things they really don’t mean.  He stopped me and said, ‘No, I owe 
it to them to listen.’ 
  I share this story because I think it emphasizes the kind of person Kip was and still 
is.  I think it also shows that there really should be no concern for this kind of thing to 
happen again. 
  I love my brother more than I ever thought possible.  And not because he needs me 
to, but because I need to.  It is a difficult concept for an outsider to understand, but it 
comes from what is inside us. 
  He will need support, love, medical help, et cetera.  But most of all right now, he 
needs hope.  In twenty-five years, we will be well into the Twenty-first Century.  Our 
society will be very different.  The technology and knowledge we will have then is mind 
boggling.  The advances we will have made in psychological research and medication will 
amaze us.  Kip will be forty. 
  Thank you for your time in reading this.  I wanted to speak from my heart and hope 
you will forgive the informality of this letter.  I realize you have a huge amount of things 
to consider in this case, and I hope I haven’t sounded like a nagging sister.  Thanks again 
for your attention. 
Id. 
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versus concurrent possibilities for the attempted murder counts.  Here is 
Michael Crowley, father of student Ryan Crowley, on that issue: 
Your Honor, don’t tell Kip that it didn’t matter when he pointed the gun at 
Ryan’s head and pulled the trigger.  Don’t tell Ryan it was no big deal, it 
doesn’t matter, “you don’t matter.” . . . If you don’t run the sentence 
consecutively, it is the same effect as saying it didn’t happen, there is no 
penalty.  Do not treat it as if nothing happened.  Do not send the message to 
my son and the other children that their suffering has no consequences to 
Kip . . . .77 
A parent of a wounded student said, “Anything less [than life in prison] 
would be a slap in the face on the victims and the families of children you have 
murdered.”78  Another parent warned the judge: 
All of the victims, as I’ve heard today, stand united in wanting Kip Kinkel put 
in prison for the rest of his life.  If it doesn’t happen, and Kip has the potential 
to be released back into society, then another crisis is going to occur, for every 
family affected by this crime, and many others that reacted to it.  So this is 
what you can do, now, to affect our future.  That’s what you can do to help my 
family.79 
The sentencing judge clearly felt the impact of these statements.  After 
hearing from the victims, and from Kinkel,80 the judge ordered a sentence of 
111 years, making it certain that Kinkel would die in prison.81  The judge noted 
in his sentencing order that his decision had been affected by the victims’ 
sentiments: “It became very apparent yesterday that this sentence needed to 
account for each of the wounded, who rightly call themselves survivors, and 
 
 77. Frontline, supra note 52, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ 
kinkel/trial/victims.html. 
 78. Victim Impact Statements, supra note 69, at 41. 
 79. Id. at 69. 
 80. See Frontline, supra note 54.  Kinkel read this statement: 
  I have spent days trying to figure out what I want to say.  I have crumpled up dozens 
of pieces of paper and disregarded even more ideas.  I have thought about what I could 
say that might make people feel just a little bit better.  But I have come to the realization 
that it really doesn’t matter what I say.  Because there is nothing I can do to take away any 
of the pain and destruction I have caused.  I absolutely loved my parents and had no 
reason to kill them.  I had no reason to dislike, kill or try to kill anyone at Thurston.  I am 
truly sorry that this has happened.  I have gone back in my mind hundreds of times and 
changed one detail, one small event so this never would have happened.  I wish I could.  I 
take full responsibility for my actions.  These events have pulled me down into a state of 
deterioration and self-loathing that I didn’t know existed.  I am very sorry for everything I 
have done, and for what I have become. 
Available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/trial/#5. 
 81. See Frontline, supra note 52, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/kinkel/trial/judge.html. 
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for Mr. Kinkel to know there was a price to be paid for each person hit by his 
bullets.”82 
The reader will no doubt have noticed in my account of the Kinkel 
sentencing the sorts of public reactions to crime I mentioned earlier in this 
article: intense hatred and dehumanization of Kinkel (“if a dog got rabid . . . 
you destroy it”), abandonment of a commitment to moral behavior (“for you to 
be tortured and troubled . . . is the final justice”); blindness to public benefit 
from any disposition other than the maximum possible sentence (“[a]nything 
less . . . would be a slap in the face on the victims”).83  These reactions could 
have been diminished by a court that took seriously its role of reminding the 
people about our Constitution’s commitment to human rights.  The judge in the 
Kinkel case should have done this.  He should have pointed out to the victims 
the humanity of the defendant and the defendant’s mental illness and suffering. 
The Kinkel sentencing also displayed a profound misunderstanding about 
the noncompensatory character of criminal justice, a misunderstanding 
exacerbated when the judge caved in to victim demands that the sentence pay 
each of them back for their wounds.  The judge should have reinforced the 
notion that criminal sentences serve public goals and not private ones.  He also 
should have discussed with the victims the benefits to them, and the public as a 
whole, of a fair and impartial sentence, regardless of its length.  He should 
have addressed seriously the goal of rehabilitation. 
I do not mean to suggest that the judge in the Kinkel case was ill-
intentioned or malicious.  Rather, he was unenlightened by example.  He had 
seen nothing in recent opinions by the justices of the United States Supreme 
Court to serve as inspiration or to give him the courage to resist victims’ angry 
demands.  Although I have not spoken with him, I have spoken with other 
Oregon trial judges about victim statements at sentencing.  Those I have 
spoken with have agreed that victim demands put unbearable pressure on 
judges to enact harsher sentences than they would otherwise believe to be 
appropriate.  One judge acknowledged that it is wrong—and even illegal under 
 
 82. See id., available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kinkel/trial/ 
judge.html.  The judge also based his sentence on a recent change to the Oregon Constitution, 
which formerly stated: “Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of 
reformation, and not of vindictive justice.”  OR. CONST., art. I, § 15 (1859).  In 1996, Oregon 
voters amended the constitution to read: “Laws for the punishment of crimes shall be founded on 
these principles: the protection of society, personal responsibility, accountability for one’s 
actions, and reformation.”  Id.  (1996).  Finally, the judge compared the seriousness of Kinkel’s 
conduct with that of other defendants he had sentenced.  Frontline, supra note 52. 
 83. There were, as well, at least two violations of Kinkel’s free-standing due process rights, 
although it is not my purpose here to argue doctrine.  First, Kinkel’s due process rights were 
violated when the judge permitted the victims to give their opinions about the appropriate 
sentence, and second, due process was offended when the judge enacted sentence after hearing 
the sentencing demands of a large angry crowd in his courtroom.  The pressure on the judge 
should leave us in doubt that the sentence was fair and impartial. 
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Oregon law—to permit victims to make sentencing demands,84 but she said she 
was helpless to stop it or to engage in the kind of teaching that I have urged in 
this essay. 
Of all judges, surely Supreme Court justices are best positioned to teach 
the difficult lessons of due process, insulated as they are from the political 
process and the raw emotions of the trial courtroom.  The silence of these 
privileged judicial officers suggests that we need to call them to their senses. 
 
 
 84. Victims in Oregon are permitted by statute to explain the impact of the crime and to give 
their views about the defendant and those sentencing matters that relate to victim compensation—
i.e., restitution and a compensatory fine.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 137.013 (1999).  Oregon statutes 
(including its capital sentencing statute) do not, however, give victims the right to speak about 
other aspects of criminal sentencing.  Id.  See also § 163.150(1)(a). The Oregon Constitution 
includes a provision granting victims “the right to be present at and, upon specific request, . . . to 
be heard at . . . sentencing.”  OR. CONST. art. I, § 42, cl. 1(a).  There are no cases yet interpreting 
the breadth of that right. 
